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    題名: 租稅規避對高階管理者異動之影響
    The Impact of Tax Avoidance on Top Management Turnover
    作者: 簡士鈞
    Chien, Shih-Chun
    貢獻者: 郭弘卿
    簡士鈞
    Chien, Shih-Chun
    關鍵詞: 租稅規避
    高階管理者異動
    Tax avoidance
    top management turnover
    日期: 2019
    上傳時間: 2019-08-07 15:56:10 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文以2011至2016年間台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，並以帳面有效稅率、現金有效稅率、財稅差異衡量租稅規避程度，探討租稅規避程度與高階管理者異動之關聯性。本文分別以羅吉特機率模型測試租稅規避程度對董事長與總經理異動的影響；以t檢定與MWW檢定檢驗董事長與總經理異動後對租稅規避程度的影響。實證結果顯示租稅規避程度較同業為高與董事長發生受迫性異動呈正相關，表示董事會對於董事長進行租稅規避所產生的聲譽損失、股價下跌等衍生成本，以及可能伴隨租稅規避發生的管理者操縱損益、內部控制效果下降、管理者自利行為等較為關心；而高階管理者發生異動後，租稅規避程度有反轉之現象，表示繼任者為滿足董事會的要求而改變企業的租稅策略，符合常識理論。
    This study examines the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and top management turnover. I use the public company data dated 2010 to 2016 in Taiwan and measure the degree of tax avoidance by effective tax rates, cash effective tax rates, and book-tax difference. I established Logit model to investigate the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and chairman or CEO turnover. I also established t-test and MWW to investigate the change of corporate tax avoidance after the chairman or CEO turnover. The results show that chairman of the board is more likely to turnover when firm engage in higher tax avoidance, which indicate the board are more concern about non-tax cost such as reputation and potential price drop, and other complications such as earnings manipulation, loss in internal control, and management rent diversion. Also, degree of tax avoidance will turnover after the change of the top management, which indicate that successor of the top management will follow the request of the board and change the corporate tax strategy.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    106353026
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1063530261
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900456
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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