政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/124126

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/124126

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政大典藏 > College of Commerce > Department of Finance > Theses > Item 140.119/124126

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124126

Title:	社會資本對聯貸結構的影響—以借款公司及主辦銀行觀點探討 The impact of social capital on syndicate structures - borrowing company and lead arranger perspectives
Authors:	張以昕 Chang, Yi-Hsin
Contributors:	張元晨張以昕 Chang, Yi-Hsin
Keywords:	社會資本聯合貸款主辦銀行 Social Capital Syndicate Loan Lead Arranger
Date:	2019
Issue Date:	2019-07-01 10:44:35 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	社會資本在社會科學領域已被廣泛證實對社會、社群以及個人都具有經濟利益。同時亦有文獻在探討社會資本對上市公司的經濟利益。銀行聯貸是公司重要的融資來源、也是銀行獲利的來源之一，本文利用美國地區的聯貸資料，驗證社會資本與聯貸結構的關聯性。聯貸結構細分為三種，聯貸組成的放款人總數、主辦銀行保留的貸款美元金額、以及主辦銀行保留的貸款比例。另外本研究分為兩部份，分別就借款公司、以及主辦銀行分析。實證結果發現，當借款公司的總部所在地之社會資本越高，則因為社會資本可作為加強監督機制，所以聯貸結構的集中程度就越低，主辦銀行可以組成成員更多的銀行團，並且可以持有較低份額的貸款比例。若是主辦銀行位於社會資本水平較高的縣，主辦銀行因此聲譽較為良好而更值得信任，則聯貸案件的組成結構較為分散，主辦銀行可以吸引更多參與者組成銀行團，並且可持有較小的金額、比例的貸款。在聯貸案件中扮演重大角色的借款公司、或主辦銀行，其總部所在地的社會資本程度越高，皆可吸引到更多參與者、組成更大的銀行團，並且主辦銀行不須負擔高比例的聯貸金額做為向參貸行許下加強盡職調查和監督的承諾。 Social capital has been widely proven in the social sciences to have positive economic benefits for societies, communities and individuals. Syndicate loan is an important source for company financing and one of the sources of bank earning profit. In this study, we verify the correlation between social capital and syndicate structure with US syndicated data. Our study proxied for loan syndicate structures with three variables, the total number of lenders, the dollar amount and percentage of the loan kept by the lead arranger. We focus on two aspects of the major roles of bank loan syndicate: borrowing company and lead arranger. Our empirical result shows that firms located in higher levels of social capital areas incur lower level of the concentration of syndicate structure because social capital can enhance the monitor mechanism. That is, there could be formed a larger bank group and lead arranger could hold a smaller amount of the loan both in dollar amount and in percentage of the loan. Another empirical result shows that lead arrangers headquartered in higher social capital counties incur higher bank reputation Therefore lead arrangers could attract more participants and keep smaller percentage of the loan. Borrowing companies and lead arrangers play crucial roles in syndicate loans. They could attract more participating banks, form a larger bank group and lead arrangers need not afford the high portion of loan if lending companies and lead arrangers locate in high-social-capital area.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學財務管理學系 106357013
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106357013
Data Type:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU201900126
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Finance] Theses

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