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    題名: 審計委員會網絡與內部控制缺陷的關係
    The Relation between Audit Committee Network and Internal Control Deficiency
    作者: 郝倩文
    Hao, Qian-Wen
    貢獻者: 金成隆
    Chin, Chen-Lung
    郝倩文
    Hao, Qian-Wen
    關鍵詞: 審計委員會網絡
    中心性
    結構洞性
    內部控制缺陷
    Audit committee network
    Centrality
    Structural hole
    Internal control deficiency
    日期: 2019
    上傳時間: 2019-07-01 10:41:41 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 隨著經濟的發展和社會關係理論的興起，學術界開始採用人與人之間非正式的社會網絡關係代替個人屬性進行研究。本文通過構建不同公司審計委員會間的社會網絡關係，以審計委員會在網絡中所處的位置結構來衡量其對公司內部控制缺陷的影響。本研究的主要發現如下：第一，公司審計委員會的網絡中心性和結構洞性越強，其發生內部控制缺陷的可能性越低，內部控制缺陷數量和程度也越小。第二，相較於結構洞性，中心性對企業內部控制缺陷所產生的影響更顯著。
    The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the association between audit committee’s network and the firm’s internal control quality. The audit committee network is measured by the committee’s centrality and structural role, respectively. Based on a sample of listed firms in China during 2010 - 2017, this paper indicates that firms with better audit committee centrality are less likely to experience internal control deficiency and experience less frequently; I also find that the degree of internal control deficiency is negatively related to audit committee centrality. Second, using the structural hole as an alternative proxy for committee network, I find that the results remain qualitatively the same. Finally, this paper reveals that the positive network-control quality relation is more pronounced when using centrality as a proxy for network than when using structural role. In sum, audit committee network has a positive effect on the firm’s internal control quality, at least in terms of centrality or structural hole.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    106353047
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353047
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.009.2019.F07
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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