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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/123257


    Title: 財政制度變遷時中央與地方策略互動之分析－以分稅制與廣東省為例
    Strategic Interaction between Central and Local during Fiscal Institutional Transformation: The Case of Guangdong`s Tax Assignment System
    Authors: 王嘉州
    Wang, Chia-Chou
    Contributors: 中國大陸研究
    Keywords: 分稅制;策略互動;中央與地方關係;理性抉擇制度論
    Tax Assignment System;Strategic Interaction;Central-Local Relations;Rational Choisce Institonalism
    Date: 2003-09
    Issue Date: 2019-05-08 09:41:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文主旨在建構中央與地方之策略互動架構，並以分稅制及廣東省為例，以驗證此分析架構的有效性。本研究發現，分稅制對廣東乃屬不利之政策，加上廣東政經力量在各省間均名列前茅，故廣東採取抗拒之對策。中央對廣東抗拒之行為未採取懲罰而採調和之對應方式，除因廣東政經力量強大外，其他省市同表抗拒也是主要原因。因此，中央與廣東策略互動之結果為「部分妥協」。此一結果，使廣東與中央各有所得：中央之所得主要是使中央從財政依賴廣東轉變成廣東財政依賴中央。至於廣東所得到的則是繼續「藏富成功」。此外，廣東與中央互蒙其利的部份則包括廣東財政收入與經濟的快遞增長，以及國有企業虧損的改善。
    This paper seeks to construct a framework of strategic interaction between central and local governments. The framework is tested by using tax assignment system and Guangdong as an example. The research found that the tax assignment system is harmful to Guangdong as it ranks at top of the political-economic power listing; therefore, Guangdong resists to the system. The response of the central to Guangdong`s resistance has been to punish but to compromise. This due only to Guangdong`s powerful political and economic strength, but also because of the resistance from other local governments. ”Partial compromise” is the consequence of the strategic interaction between the central Guangdong, with both Guangdong and the central government acquire acquire what they need. The central govetnment successfully switches the role of fiscal dependence to being fiscal depended. Guangdong continues to retain the fact of ”keeping fortune” within province. In addition, mutually beneficial between central and Guangdong includes acceleration fiscal income, Guangdong is economic growth and reducing the deficit of state owned industries.
    Relation: 中國大陸研究, 46(5), 81-103
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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