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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120484


    Title: 公共選擇與投票行爲理論之研究
    Authors: 鄭瓊秋
    Contributors: 劉永憲
    鄭瓊秋
    Date: 1982
    Issue Date: 2018-10-11 09:31:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 提要
    傳統的經濟理論假設完全競爭市場的存在，市場的價格制度可以充分發揮其功能，而使資源作最有效的配置。然而，在現實社會裡，由於生產成本遞減，邊際成本等於零、集體消費及外部效果等很多情況的存在，致使市場制度無法順利運行；在此種情況下，若任由市場制度自由操作，而不給予外力的協助，則會使經濟資源的配置缺乏「效率 」（efficiency）。因此，當現實社會處於市場機能失去作用（market failure）時，則需要公共部門採取措施以資補救。其次，由於社會上一般人士對於現行價格制度所形成的所得分配狀況不表贊同，政府基於倫理的判斷，也應採取措施予以補救。
    制度與思想的產生均源於對問題的設法解決。由於理想的私經濟市場機能可能失效，近年來許多有關政治經濟學（Political Economy）的文獻多集中於分析如何經由投票以從事最適的公共選擇，本文主要的研究動機在於提出各學者所建立的理論模型，分別探討如何利用投票方法，正確地顯示人民對公兵財貨或公共服務的需求，以謀此等問題的合理解決，提高社會全體的福利。
    綜合對公共選擇的各種決策原則與規範的檢討，以及檢定相關的實證研究，可以知道欲達成團體共識有諸多困難。例如：循環現象、選票交易、價值判斷、偏好顯示、知識訊息、 … …、 對於上面問題的設法解決，已發展成公共選擇理論（Public Choice Theory），撰寫本文之目的，卽在研討各種有關的理論方法、發掘各項尚待解決的問題，並提出本文作者不成熟的見解。
    本文結構計分七章；第一章「前言」； 第二章為「非市場經濟決策的情況與基礎」；第三章為「決策規則與投票行為的探討」；第四章為「規範面的公共選擇」；第五章為「公共選擇的實際應用」；第六章為「偏好顯示、財政認知與公共選擇」；第七章為「結論」。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    70
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002007401
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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