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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/120337


    Title: 公司董監事席次變動對IPO的影響
    Board Member Turnover and Business Milestone
    Authors: 葉祖昀
    Yeh, Tsu-Yun
    Contributors: 王信實
    李文傑

    Wang, Shinn-Shyr
    Lee, Wen-Chieh

    葉祖昀
    Yeh, Tsu-Yun
    Keywords: 教育連結
    董監事席次變動
    新創公司
    創業投資
    國發基金
    Educational link
    Board member turnover
    New venture
    Venture capital
    National development fund
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-10-01 12:23:39 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: In the paper, we are going to figure out what factor has the most significant influence on firm’s performance. Based on the pervious definition of educational link method, there are additional variables about changes on board and management team members. The result shows that the higher rate the members change, the better chance of IPO firms has. In other words, the changes of board and team members have a significantly positive effect on firms’ performance. Before going public, firms would like to reform their team structure to make the funding easier. It implied that it is also very crucial for firms to hire better human capital. As firms become greater and greater, they can attract more and more talented people to work for them so that it will increase the possibility to go public.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    應用經濟與社會發展英語碩士學位學程(IMES)
    1032660051
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1032660051
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.IMES.008.2018.F06
    Appears in Collections:[International Master`s Program of Applied Economics and Social Development] Theses

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