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    題名: 從價、從量與成本補貼三種出口貿易政策福利效果之比較－多家廠商的情況
    Welfare Comparison among Ad Valorem, Specific and Cost Subsidiary Export Trade Policy－the Case of Multiple Firms
    作者: 周孜庭
    Chou, Chih-Ting
    貢獻者: 翁堃嵐
    周孜庭
    Chou, Chih-Ting
    關鍵詞: 成本異質
    從價補貼
    從量補貼
    成本補貼
    租稅扭曲
    Cost heterogeneity
    Specific export subsidy
    Ad valorem export subsidy
    Cost export subsidy
    Tax distortion
    日期: 2018
    上傳時間: 2018-08-27 14:58:52 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 翁堃嵐與郭虹瑩 (2010)考慮融通出口貿易政策時之成本面及租稅面因素，在多家本國廠商之情況下發現，從量出口補貼政策會優於從價出口補貼政策。因實務上成本補貼出口貿易政策亦為政府所常採用之方式，本文延伸前揭文章，加入成本補貼之探討，並比較不同出口貿易政策下之社會福利水準。研究顯示：社會福利之多寡與補貼是否造成社會成本、廠商邊際成本之異質性以及廠商邊際成本與平均成本間關係密切相關。在不考慮補貼造成之社會成本的情況下，當廠商之邊際成本同質，從量、從價及成本補貼三種貿易政策之社會福利水準相同；當廠商之邊際成本有異質性，從價及成本補貼下之社會福利水準相同，且低於從量補貼貿易政策下之社會福利水準。若考慮補貼造成之社會成本，從價補貼之社會福利水準無論在何種情形下皆為最低，而當廠商邊際成本同質，且廠商之平均邊際成本高於成本補貼下之平均成本，成本補貼之社會福利水準高於從量補貼、廠商之平均邊際成本低於成本補貼下之平均成本，從量補貼之社會福利水準高於成本補貼；當廠商邊際成本有異質性時，廠商之平均邊際成本低於成本補貼下之平均成本，從量補貼之社會福利水準高於成本補貼；然而，當廠商之平均邊際成本高於成本補貼下之平均成本，從量補貼及成本補貼下之社會福利水準大小則不明確。
    Ueng and Kuo (2010) considered the cost side and the tax side when financing the export subsidy, suggested that the policy of the specific export subsidy dominates that of ad valorem export subsidy under the case of multi-domestic firms. Nevertheless, the cost export subsidiary trade policies often been adopted by government, this paper extends prior research, further discuss cost subsidy and compare the welfare under specific, ad valorem and cost export subsidiary. We find that social welfare is associated with the social cost caused by subsidy, the marginal cost is homogeneous or heterogeneous and the magnitude of average cost and marginal cost. When we ignore the cost caused by subsidy and marginal cost is homogeneous, the social welfare under specific export subsidy, ad valorem export subsidy and cost export subsidy is the same. If marginal cost is heterogeneous, social welfare under cost export subsidy is the same with ad valorem export subsidy and inferior to specific export subsidy. When considering the cost caused by subsidy, the social welfare under ad valorem export subsidy is always the least. If marginal cost is homogeneous, and firm’s average marginal cost is higher than the average cost under cost export subsidy, cost export subsidy dominates specific export subsidy. On the other hand, if firm’s average marginal cost is less than the average cost under cost export subsidy, specific export subsidy dominates cost export subsidy. Finally, if marginal cost is heterogeneous, and firm’s average marginal cost is higher than the average cost under cost export subsidy, we cannot decide the superiority of specific export subsidy and cost export subsidy. When firm’s average marginal cost is less than the average cost under cost export subsidy, specific export subsidy dominates cost export subsidy.
    參考文獻: 翁堃嵐、郭虹瑩 (2010)，〈從價 V.S.從量出口貿易政策的福利效果之比較多家本國廠商的情況〉，《經濟與管理論叢》，第6卷第1期，頁17-32。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    104255018
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104255018
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.024.2018.F07
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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