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    Title: 企業社會責任、民營化與補貼政策
    Corporate Social Responsibility, Privatization and Subsidy
    Authors: 侯雨君
    Hou, Yu-Chun
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    侯雨君
    Hou, Yu-Chun
    Keywords: 混合寡占
    民營化
    補貼政策
    民營化政策中立性定理
    企業社會責任
    環境企業社會責任
    Mixed oligopoly model
    Privatization
    Subsidy policies
    Privatization neutrality theorem
    Corporate social responsibility
    Environmental corporate social responsibility
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-08-10 10:51:36 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 過去探討民營化與政府補貼政策之文獻,大多將焦點著重在政府與廠商間的互動,鮮少將廠商因應消費者消費型態改變所衍生出的其他生產活動納入考量。有鑑於此,本文沿用White (1996)一文之分析架構,建構一混合寡占模型,並分別引入近年來受到消費者重視的企業社會責任(corporate social responsibility, CSR)以及環境企業社會責任(environmental corporate social responsibility, ECSR)。
    本文研究顯示: (1)當生產不具外部性時,公私營廠商皆從事CSR活動的情況下,民營化政策中立性定理(privatization neutrality theorem)成立。(2)當生產具負向外部性時,公私營廠商皆從事ECSR活動的情況下,民營化政策中立性定理則無法成立。甚至當污染的邊際損害很大,而消費者對企業從事ECSR活動的偏好不顯著時,政府的最適政策將由補貼轉為課稅。(3)當生產會對環境造成汙染時,即使在公私營廠商皆從事ECSR活動的情況下,民營化仍會對整體社會福利造成負面影響,這與一般探討民營化與環境議題的文獻結果一致。
    In the past, the literature on privatization and government subsidy policies are mostly focused on the interaction between government and manufacturers, and rarely considered other production derived from the changes in consumer’s consumption patterns. On that account, this paper follows the analysis framework of White (1996), and constructed a mixed oligopoly model introducing the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) that have been valued by consumers in recent years.

    This paper shows:
    (1) The Privatization Neutrality Theorem is established when the production of both public and private firms is not external and are engaged in CSR activities.
    (2) The Privatization Neutrality Theorem cannot be established when both public and private firms have a negative production externality and are engaged in ECSR activities. When the consumer’s preference for ECSR activities is not significant, and even the marginal damage of pollution is tremendous, the government’s optimal policy will be converted from subsidies to taxation.
    (3) When the production leads to environmental pollution, even if both public and private firms are engaged in ECSR activities, privatization will still have a negative impact on social welfare; which is consistent with the general literature of privatization and environmental issues.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    104255026
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550263
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.022.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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