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    題名: 公司治理特性與財務風險關係之研究－金融業與非金融業之比較
    The Relationship between Corporate Governance Characteristics and Financial Risks: A Comparison between Financial and Non-financial Firms
    作者: 鍾亞嶙
    Chung, Ya-Lin
    貢獻者: 彭金隆
    陳鴻毅
    Peng, Jin-Lung
    Chen, Hong-Yi
    鍾亞嶙
    Chung, Ya-Lin
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    金融產業
    財務風險
    風險預測
    Corporate governance
    Financial industry
    Financial risk
    Risk forecasting
    日期: 2018
    上傳時間: 2018-07-10 15:33:50 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以 2000 年至 2016 年之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討公司治理特性在金融業與非金融業間對財務風險之解釋。在進一步考量公司治理相關法規的設置後，得出以下結論：(1) 公司經理人較其他內部人與機構投資者更了解公司營運，且為保住職位而更有誘因降低公司的財務風險；(2) 雖然董事會規模越大越能降低公司財務風險，但也因此降低決策效率而使獲利能力下降；(3) 非金融業中，董監質押比越高，則財務風險越高。相關法規設置後，甚至加劇董監質押比對公司獲利能力的負面影響；(4)主動設置獨立董事可降低公司財務風險，但為符合法規而設置獨董則對獲利能力有負面影響。對於將公司治理變數作為財務風險預測指標之討論，進一步比對實證結果後發現，雖董監質押比可捕捉非金融產業中各構面之風險，然唯有以經理人持股比例預測財務風險 時，可同時適用於金融與非金融產業而無誤判之情形。
    Using a sample of Taiwan’s listed firms from 2000 to 2016, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and financial risks in the financial and non-financial industries. With consideration of relevant regulations for corporate governance, the following conclusions are reached: (1) Managers are more motivated than other insiders and institutional investors to reduce the financial risk of firms; (2) The larger board size is, the lower financial risk is. However, the larger board size also reduces the efficiency of decision making and makes the profitability lower; (3) In non-financial industries, the pledge ratio of directors and supervisors is positively associated with the financial risk. Furthermore, after related regulations have been set up, the negative impact of pledge ratio on the profitability is more serious; (4) Voluntary appointment of independent directors can reduce the financial risk. However, the appointment of independent directors for just complying regulations will lead a negative profitability. As for the discussion of using corporate governance variables as financial risk forecasting indicators, though pledge ratio of directors and supervisors can perfectly predict all aspects of the financial risks in non- financial industries, only managers’ shareholding ratio can predict the financial risks without misjudged in both financial and non-financial firms.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    105357028
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105357028
    資料類型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.Finance.015.2018.F07
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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