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    题名: 家族企業併購與經營績效之關聯性研究：以台灣上市櫃公司為例
    The Effect of Family Firms on Mergers and Acquiring : The Evidence of Taiwanese Listed Companies
    作者: 林雨薇
    贡献者: 許崇源
    林雨薇
    关键词: 家族企業
    併購
    經營績效
    多角化併購策略
    Family firms
    Mergers and acquisitions
    Performance
    Diversification
    日期: 2018
    上传时间: 2018-07-10 15:33:07 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 家族持有企業係目前極為普遍的形式，家族企業與非家族企業主要差異存在於代理理論，為了衡量代理問題在家族企業與非家族企業所造成的影響，以併購後之長期績效作為衡量指標，檢視台灣上市櫃公司併購後長期績效表現，並進一步探討採取多角化併購策略是否影響主併公司之價值。
    本研究以2004年起至2014年底止，台灣上市櫃公司未破局之併購案件為研究對象，共383筆樣本，相關實證結果如下：
    一、 家族企業與經營績效關聯性方面：以家族為控制型態與企業經營績效呈現顯著負相關。
    二、 採取多角化併購策略與企業經營績效關聯性方面：採取多角化併購策略與經營績效之關聯性並不顯著。
    三、 家族企業採取多角化併購策略與企業經營績效關聯性方面：家族企業採行多角化併購策略與企業經營績效之關聯性不顯著。
    　　Family firm is a popular ownership structure now. The main difference exists between family and non-family firms is the types of agency problems they possess. To measure how the agency problem affect the performance of family and non-family firms, we focus on a decision area that influenced by agency problems: mergers and acquisitions. We empirically examine the long run performance of listed companies of Taiwan Stock Exchange after they make an acquisition. Furthermore, we specifically examine the value implications of diversifying mergers.
    　　We use the completed mergers and acquisitions of Taiwanese listed firms as subjects and the research period is from 2004 to 2014. Our sample consists of 383 acquisitions. The relevant empirical results are shown below:
    First, the relationship between family firms and post-merge performance: they show a significant negative correlation.
    Second, the relationship between diversification and post-merge performance: the correlation is not significant.
    Third, the relationship between family firms take diversification strategy in mergers and acquisitions and post-merge performance: the correlation is not significant.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    105353006
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353006
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.015.2018.F07
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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