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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/118225


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118225


    Title: CEO特質對跨國併購績效之影響：以美國併新興國家為例
    The effect of CEO traits on cross-board M&A： U.S. evidence
    Authors: 陳加翎
    Chen, Chia-Ling
    Contributors: 吳啟銘
    Wu, Chi-Ming
    陳加翎
    Chen, Chia-Ling
    Keywords: 併購績效
    跨國併購
    CEO特質
    Merger performance
    Cross-border M&A
    CEO traits
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-03 17:24:49 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 隨著科技的進步和新興國家的崛起，越來越多已開發國家向新興國家進行跨國併購。相對已開發國家間的併購，向新興國家進行的跨國併購因經濟程度、文化差異和投資人保護等原因，併購的風險相對較高，所以主併公司的公司治理機制應更為重要，而CEO在此決策中扮演著極為重要的角色。因此，本文研究CEO特質對美國併新興國家的跨國併購績效影響。
    本文在績效方面分成長短期探討，在短期績效方面，本文發現CEO權益基礎薪酬比降低代理問題，因而提升短期併購績效。反之，CEO職位雙元性則加劇代理問題，降低短期併購績效。而在加入公司過去績效不佳的條件之後，短期績效方面，CEO教育程度會提升市場的認同，因而提升併購績效。長期績效方面，CEO任期降低併購績效，而CEO職位雙元性則提升併購績效。
    With advances in technology and the rise of emerging countries, more and more developed countries make merger and acquisition in emerging countries. Due to economic level, cultural differences and investor protection, etc., the risk of M&A in emerging counties is relatively high, so the company’s corporate governance mechanism should be more important, and the CEO plays an extremely significant role in this decision. Therefore, the major purpose of paper is to test the effect of CEO traits on the performance of cross-border M&A.
    In short-term performance, this paper finds that CEO equity-based compensation ratio will reduce the agency problem and will enhance short-term M&A performance. However, duality of CEO positions will increase agency problems and reduce short-term M&A performance. In addition, consider the condition of company`s poor performance in the past. In short-term performance under this condition, the degree of CEO education will increase M&A performance. In long-term performance under this condition, CEO tenure will reduce M&A performance while duality of CEO position will enhance M&A performance.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理學系
    105357012
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105357012
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.Finance.007.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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