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    题名: 政治關聯與租稅規避之關係
    Coporate Political Connections and Tax Avoidance
    作者: 丁翎育
    Ding, Ling-Yu
    贡献者: 何怡澄
    Ho, Yi-Cheng
    丁翎育
    Ding, Ling-Yu
    关键词: 租稅規避
    政治關聯
    Tax avoidance
    Corporate political connections
    日期: 2017
    上传时间: 2018-07-03 17:23:07 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討具政治關聯之企業是否具有較高的租稅規避程度。本研究以董事會成員是否具有政治背景、經歷作為企業政治關聯之代理變數，人工搜集具有政治背景、經歷者名單，彙整成政治背景資料庫。以 2005 至 2015 年台灣上、下市（櫃）企業為研究對象，將各企業歷屆董事會成員名單與政治背景資料庫中的名單媒合，辨別出具有政治背景、經歷之董事會成員。實證結果發現，具政治關聯之企業，其租稅規避程度較高。此結果呼應過去文獻所闡述政治關聯為企業帶來之益處：有較低的偵查風險、較容易取得關於未來稅法變動與施行之資訊、來自資本市場要求財務資訊透明化的壓力較小、對於激進的租稅規劃所帶來的政治成本較低，以及能夠承擔較高的風險。另外，檢驗政治關聯強度對租稅規避之影響，發現當企業具有政治背景、經歷之董事人數愈多，企業租稅規避程度愈高。
    This paper investigates whether companies with corporate political connections have higher levels of tax avoidance. Using a hand- collected data set of the political connections of Taiwan-listed corporations over the 2005–2015 time period, we find that politically connected firms are likely to have high level of tax avoidance. The result is consistent with the advantages of politically connected firms: lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, lower political costs of being tax aggressive and greater risk-taking tendencies induced by political connections. In addition, we use different measure for the strength of political connection and find consistent evidence that politically connected companies have higher level of tax avoidance.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    104353101
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353101
    数据类型: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.006.2018.F07
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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