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    題名: 公共財實驗的合作與競爭
    Cooperation and Competition in Public Goods Experiment
    作者: 李孟庭
    Lee, MengTing
    貢獻者: 徐麗振
    李孟庭
    Lee, MengTing
    關鍵詞: 公共財實驗
    每人邊際報酬
    組內競爭
    日期: 2017
    上傳時間: 2018-02-05 16:01:09 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究進行公共財捐獻實驗，共分為三個組別進行，分別給定受試者不同的每人邊際報酬 (marginal per capita returns, i.e., MPCR)，觀察受試者的捐獻決策與最終實驗結果會有何差異。而在實驗中受試者彼此處於組內競爭的關係，在每回合的捐獻決策後，組員彼此以多數決投票的方式決定一位組員出局，因此最終能獲得共同帳戶點數者僅有最後的贏家一人。本實驗共有四個發現，第一：α相同組中所有組員MPCR皆為0.5，實驗結果顯示每位組員的平均捐獻率並無顯著差異。第二：在受試者α不同的組別中，受試者的MPCR不盡相同，而具有高MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較低，而具有低MPCR的組員平均捐獻率較高。第三：在組員的投票決策方面，在α皆異組中六位組員的MPCR皆不相同，而每個階段的實驗中，組員的出局順序呈現由MPCR最高至低，最後反而是MPCR低的組員獲勝的機會最高。α兩同組中則是六位組員MPCR兩兩相同，實驗結果顯示MPCR處於整組中間的組員佔據較高勝率。第四：不論是哪個組別的實驗，都顯示隨著實驗的進行，受試者的平均捐獻率皆呈現逐漸下降的趨勢，此結果和未競爭的公共財實驗相同。
    參考文獻: Andreoni, J. (1988), “Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics 37, 291-304.
    Andreoni, J. (1990), “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal 100, 464-477.
    Andreoni, J. and J.H. Miller (1993), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Experimental Evidence,” Economic Journal 103, 570-585.
    Andreoni, J. (1995), “Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?” The American Economics Review 85, 891-904.
    Bagnoli, M. and M. McKee (1991), “Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private Provision of Public Goods,” Economic Inquiry 29, 351-366.
    Clark, K. and M. Sefton (2001), “The Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation,” Economic Journal 111, 51-58.
    Croson, Rachel T.A. (1996), “Partners and Strangers Revisited,” Economics Letters 53, 25–32.
    Croson, Rachel T.A. (1998), “Theories of Altruism and Reciprocity: Evidence from Linear Public Goods Games.” Working paper, The Wharton School.
    Davis, D and Holt, (1993), Experimental Economics (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ).
    Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review 90, 980-994.
    Fisher, Joseph, R. Isaac, J. Schatzberg and J. Walker (1995), “Heterogeneous Demand for Public Goods: Behavior in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Public Choice 85, 249-266.
    Harrison, Glenn W. and Jack Hirshleifer (1989), “An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods,” Journal of Political Economy 97, 201-225.
    Isaac, R. M., K. McCue and C. Plott (1985), “Public Goods Provision in Experimental Environment,” Journal of Public Economics 26, 51-74.
    Isaac, R.M. and J.M. Walker (1988), “Group Size Effect in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 179-199.
    James W. Julian and Franklyn A. Perry (1967), “Cooperation Contrasted with Intra-group and Inter-group Competition,” Sociometry 30, 79-90.
    Jack Hirshleifer (1983), “From Weakest Link to Best Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, Public Choice 41, 371-386.
    Kreps, D.M., P. Milgrom, J. Robert, and R. Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economics Theory 27, 245-252.
    Kim, O. and M. Walker (1984), “The Free Rider Problem: Experimental Evidence,” Public Choice 43, 3-24.
    Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1979), “Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods Ⅰ: Resources, Interest, Group Size, and the Free Rider Problem,” American Journal of Sociology 84, 1335-1360.
    Marwell, G. and R.E. Ames (1981), “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?” Journal of Public Economics 15, 295-310.
    Palfrey, T.R. and Prisbrey, J.E. (1996), “Altruism, Reputation, and Noise in Linear Public Goods Experiments,” Journal of Public Economics 61, 409-427.
    Steven D. Levitt (2003), “Testing Theories of Discrimination: Evidence from “Weakest Link”,” NBER Working paper, NO. 9949.
    L. C. Thomas (2003), “The Best Banking Strategy when Playing the Weakest Link,” The Journal of Operational Research Society 7, 747-750.
    Warr, P.G. (1982), “Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity,” Journal of Public Economics 19, 131-138.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    104255005
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1042550051
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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