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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/115621


    Title: 老人退休消費與全民健保醫療行為實證分析
    Authors: 王儷玲
    Contributors: 風險管理與保險學系
    Keywords: 全民健康保險;事前道德危險;健康檢查;中老年人
    National Health Insurance;Ex ante Moral Hazard;Precautionary Health Care;The Elderly
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2018-01-24 14:54:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 保險市場是否存在資訊不對稱的現象，一直是保險研究文獻中一個重要的議題。雖然有許多學者提出不同的理論模型與實證結果來檢證這個問題，但由於無法區分資訊不對稱之現象與所造成的原因，因此始終沒有明確的定論。本研究藉由台灣實施全民健保的環境，重新檢驗是否存在事前道德危險(ex ante Moral hazard)的效果。本研究利用國民健康局1989年到2007年所提供的「中老年身心社會生活狀況長期追蹤調查資料」，利用差異中的差異(difference-in-difference)方法來分析全民健保實施前後，中老 年人對預防健康檢查的需求是否受到影響，以及事前道德危險是否存在，並透過傾向配對(propensity score matching)的方法進一步了解相同特徵個人的行為是否有所不同。本研究結果顯示強制性健康保險並不會導致事前道德危險。實證結果發現在台灣全民健康保險實施後，相對原本就有健康保險的民眾，新加入全民健康保險的中老年人在健保實施前後，並沒有顯著增加危害健康之行為。此外也發現，全民健康保險實施後中老年人對預防性健康檢查有顯著增加的現象。本研究之分析結果，將提供學術界對於健康保險與道德危險議題新的實證資料，也對是否存有資訊不對稱的現象有更完備與正確的了解。
    It has been an important issue that whether the health insurance would cause the ex ante moral hazard effect. Coverage of health insurance may reduce the prevention activities from basic economic theory, but empirical studies have yet to provide much evidence to support this prediction. This study attempted to reexamine the issue of ex ante moral hazard by analyzing the changes of the precautionary health care behaviors of the elderly before and after the implementation of the National Health Insurance. The empirical data are sourced from the Survey of Health and Living Status of the Elderly (SHLSE) from 1993 to 2006. We adopt the difference-in- differences (DID) models with propensity score matching (PSM) methods to test this issue. We find no evidence of ex ante moral hazard from precautionary health care behaviors. The implementation of NHI not results in the changing in the precautionary health care behaviors, but rather leads to significant increases in precautionary health examination. Our results provide new evidence and understanding of asymmetric information phenomenon in the health insurance market.
    Relation: 執行起迄：2014/08/01~2015/12/31
    103-2410-H-004-095
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[風險管理與保險學系] 國科會研究計畫

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