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    题名: 股份控制權和盈餘分配權的偏離程度會影響以績效為基準的考核制度誘因效果嗎？
    Does the Separation of Ownership and Control Affect the Incentive Intensity of Executive Performance-based Compensation?
    作者: 戴怡蕙
    Tai, Yi-Hui
    关键词: 股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度;以績效為基準的考核制度;控制股東;總經理
    Separation of control and share rights;Performance-based evaluation;Controlling shareholder;CEO
    日期: 2017-07
    上传时间: 2017-11-15 16:02:28 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文採用2000年至2013年上市櫃公司資料測試股份控制權和盈餘分配權 的偏離程度是否會影響以績效為基準的考核制度的誘因效果，實證結果支持勾結假說。當控制股東的股份控制權與盈餘分配權偏離程度越大時，以績效為基準的考核制度的誘因效果會下降，此時總經理及副總經理的獎酬及替換都與績效間呈現顯著負相關;且不論是考量內生性抑或區分控制股東是否兼任總經理下，此一負向關聯性均成立，顯示控制股東與總經理及副總經理間會互相勾結，並進而削弱以績效為基準的考核制度的誘因效果。此外，本研究亦發現，當公司的績效表現越差，控制股東的股份控制權和盈餘分配權偏離程度與以績效為基準的考核制度誘因效果之負向關聯性將更顯著。
    This study uses the firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the OTC stock exchange from 2010 to 2013 to investigate whether the separation of control and share rights is related to the incentive of performance-based evaluation. This research finds evidence to support the collusion hypothesis. The results suggest that the controlling shareholder with excess control rights will collude with the CEO and vice general manager through weakening the incentive of performance-based evaluation; meanwhile, the separation of control and share rights is negatively associated with the CEO and vice general manager pay-performance and turnover-performance sensitivity. The regression results by controlling for endogeneity or considering the controlling shareholder who serve as CEO are consistent with my previous findings. Furthermore, the negative relation between the separation of control and share rights and the incentive of performance-based evaluation is more pronounced in less profitable firms.
    關聯: 會計評論, 65, 1-43
    数据类型: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.2017.65.1
    DOI: 10.6552/JOAR.2017.65.1
    显示于类别:[會計評論] 期刊論文

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