政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/112281
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113303/144284 (79%)
造访人次 : 50815272      在线人数 : 831
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112281


    题名: 代理模型中的策略性利他行為
    Friendship building with boss: strategic prosocial behaviors in agency model
    作者: 蔡一豪
    Tsai, Yi Hao
    贡献者: 何靜嫺
    蔡一豪
    Tsai, Yi Hao
    关键词: 社會網路
    代理模型
    公司治理
    Social network
    Principal-Agent model
    Corporate governance
    日期: 2017
    上传时间: 2017-08-28 14:25:37 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Many recent researches examine the social networks between directors and CEO and show their negative impacts on corporate governance (see Barnea and Guedj, 2007; Gaspar and Massa, 2007). If, this negative relation between social connection and corporate governance is true, we would expect that family firms where the CEOs and directors are family members should have the worst governance and the worst performance. This certainly is not the case. So how exactly the social network between board members and CEO can influence corporate governance and the firm performance? Our paper provides the first theoretical discussion on this effect. In particular, our paper considers three scenarios: complete information where the prosocial inclinations are known for each other, incomplete information where the shareholders`.prosocial inclination (we denote as α ) is privately known for themselves, and incomplete information where the manager`s .prosocial inclination (we denote as β ) is privately known for himself.
    參考文獻: Allen, F., and Babus, A. (2009). Networks in Finance1. The Network Challenge: Strategy, Profit, and Risk in an Interlinked World, 367.
    Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007). Director networks and firm governance. Unpublished working paper, University of Texas--Austin.
    Barnea, A., and Guedj, I. (2007, April). Sympathetic boards: director networks and firm governance. In EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper, Austin.
    Bartling, B., and von Siemens, F. A. (2010). The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents. Labour Economics, 17(3), 598-607.
    Batson, D. (1998) "Altruism and Prosocial Behavior," chapter 23 in D. Gilbert, S. Fiske,and G. Lindzey eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, vol. II,. McGraw Hill, 282---316.
    Benabou, R., and Tirole, J. (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The review of economic studies, 70(3), 489-520.
    Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior." American Economic Review 96 (5): 1652--78.
    Bierbrauer, F., and Netzer, N. (2016). Mechanism design and intentions. Journal of Economic Theory, 163, 557-603.
    Braggion, F. (2011). Managers and (secret) social networks: the influence of the Freemasonry on firm performance. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(6), 1053-1081.
    Carmichael, L., and MacLeod, W. B. (2003). Caring about sunk costs: a behavioral solution to holdup problems with small stakes. Journal of law, economics, and organization, 19(1), 106-118.
    Crawford, V. P., and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1431-1451.
    Fang, H., and Moscarini, G. (2005). Morale hazard. Journal of monetary Economics, 52(4), 749-777.
    Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. The quarterly journal of economics, 114(3), 817-868.
    Freeman, R. B. (1997). Working for nothing: The supply of volunteer labor. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(1, Part 2), S140-S166.
    Frey, B. S. (1997). A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues. The Economic Journal, 107(443), 1043-1053.
    Frey, B. S., and Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory. Journal of economic surveys, 15(5), 589-611.
    Gaspar, J. M., and M. Massa, (2007). Power Plays: Intra-Firm Corporate Connections and Firm Value, working paper, INSEAD.
    Herold, F. (2010). Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 180-191.
    Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell journal of economics, 74-91.
    Itoh, H. (2004). Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences. The Japanese Economic Review, 55(1), 18-45.
    Jewitt, I. (1988). Justifying the first-order approach to principal-agent problems. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1177-1190.
    Kőszegi, B. (2014). Behavioral contract theory. Journal of Economic Literature, 52(4), 1075-1118.
    Kramarz, F., and Thesmar, D. (2013). Social networks in the boardroom. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), 780-807.
    Kuhnen, C. M. (2006). Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry.
    Nguyen, B. D. (2012). Does the Rolodex matter? Corporate elite`s small world and the effectiveness of boards of directors. Management Science, 58(2), 236-252.
    Pepper and Gore (2015) , Behavioral Agency Theory: New Foundations for Theorizing About Executive Compensation
    Pistor, K. (2007). Network-finance: An institutional innovation for a global market place. Working paper, Columbia University.
    Rey-Biel, P. (2008). Inequity aversion and team incentives. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(2), 297-320.
    Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes. American Economic Review, 97(3), 999-1012.
    Tracey, D., and Johannesson, M. (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive theory. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 990-1008.
    von Siemens, F. A. (2010). Heterogeneous social preferences, screening, and employment contracts. Oxford Economic Papers, 63(3), 499-522.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    103258009
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258009
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    800901.pdf3091KbAdobe PDF226检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈