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| Title: | 營建業家族特性、公司治理機制與公司績效
The impact of family characteristic and corporate governance on performance: evidence of Taiwan construction firms |
| Authors: | 林秀俐
Lin, Hsiu Li |
| Contributors: | 陳明吉
Chen, Ming Chi
林秀俐
Lin, Hsiu Li |
| Keywords: | 營建業
公司治理
附加經濟價值
家族企業
Construction
Corporate governance
Economic value added
Family business |
| Date: | 2017 |
| Issue Date: | 2017-08-10 09:45:01 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 營建業為國內重要的民生工業，同時也是影響國家經濟發展與競爭力的重要指標之一。由於營建業易受外部政治和經濟環境等因素影響且高度依賴財務槓桿操作，經營風險較高使營建業公司治理機制成為提高營運績效及永續發展的關鍵因素。而台灣家族企業比例高，其中又以製造業及營建業比例高於其他產業。因此，本研究亦加入家族特性來討論公司治理結構對公司績效的影響。而過去國內營建業相關文獻多以傳統會計指標作為績效衡量標準，本文採用附加經濟價值(Economic Value Added , EVA)作為公司績效衡量指標，並以董事會結構、所有權結構以及經營團隊等三個面向作為公司治理機制變數之衡量。
本研究得到實證結果如下，第一，營建業存在董事規模小，獨立董事比例低以及控制股東持股比例高的特性，使得公司董事會過於封閉、經營團隊獨立性低且缺乏外部獨立性制衡。第二，營建業家族企業公司績效劣於非家族企業公司績效，顯示良好的公司治理機制對於家族企業的永續發展更加重要。第三、相對於非家族企業，家族企業會強化董事會規模、獨立董事比例及監察人比例與公司績效之間的正向關係。而無論是家族或是非家族企業，董事長兼任總經理皆對公司績效帶來負面影響。第四、營建業家族企業當家族成員涉入管理階層比例高，由於個人利益與家族利益關係密切，使家族成員涉入經營團隊時，透過凝聚力與相同目標可以增加決策效率，並以極大化公司價值為目標，有助於公司績效的提升。最後，營建業家族持股比例越高，家族利益與公司利益緊密性越高，對於公司績效有正向的影響，而家族董事控制席次增加，加深負面影響。
Construction industry is not only an important major household industry but an indicator of economic development and competitiveness. The external political and economic environment and highly financial leverage affect the construction industry. The impact of corporate governance on performance becomes a key issue to improve the operational performance of construction industry. While the proportion of family business in manufacturing and construction industry is higher than other industries. Therefore, family characteristics are also added to discuss the impact of corporate governance on performance. In this paper, the economic value added (EVA) is used as the measure of corporate performance, and the board structure, ownership structure and management team is used as measures of corporate governance variables.
The study shows following results. First, the construction industry has three characteristics, small board size, low proportion of independence directors and high ownership concentration. Second, in the construction industry, non-family business enjoy better performance than family firms do. Third, Family business will strengthen the positive impact of board size, the proportion of independent directors and supervisors on performance. Forth, in the construction industry, family shareholder in the management team is found to be beneficial to performance. And a positive relationship exists between ownership and performance. While increase the number of directors from the family members will increase the negative impact on corporate performance. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
104357029 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104357029 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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