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    題名: 工資調整指數、績效契約與時序不一致
    Wage indexation, performance contract and time inconsistency
    作者: 詹凱宇
    Jhan, Kai-Yu
    貢獻者: 賴景昌
    Lai, Ching-Chong
    詹凱宇
    Jhan, Kai-Yu
    關鍵詞: 工資
    日期: 2017
    上傳時間: 2017-07-24 12:13:45 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文以Walsh (1995)績效契約為基礎，設計出兩種類型的工資調整指數，分別適用於勞工以及央行官員，並討論不同類型的工資調整指數，對於經濟社會是否有不同的影響。
    經由本文的分析可得到:於經濟制度中引入勞工工資調整指數，將改變原始通貨膨脹與產出水準之間的兌換關係，減少央行官員實施高通貨膨脹政策的誘因，並達到降低通貨膨脹傾向效果;相反地，引入央行官員工資調整指數，央行官員將有誘因實施越高的通貨膨脹權衡政策，反而促使經濟社會處於更高的通貨膨脹傾向。
    此外參考Candel-Sa ́nchez and Campoy-Min ̃arro (2004)之設計，考慮政府應如何設計與央行官員之間的最適績效契約，以達成極大化政府預期效用之目標。
    經由本文分析得到的結論為:績效契約懲罰比例的制定，應與社會最適產出與充分就業產出之差異呈現正相關;與社會對於通貨膨脹與產出水準的相對偏好程度呈現正相關;與勞工工資調整指數呈現負相關;與央行官員工資調整指數則呈現正相關。
    Based on the Walsh (1995) model, we develop a model featured with two distinct types of wage indexation which apply to labors and central bankers respectively, and then use it to examine how these two types of wage indexation effect the macroeconomic performance of the economy.
    Our analysis finds that the inflation bias of discretionary policy is reduced by introducing the labors’ wage indexation in the sense that it weakens the temptation of central bankers to create surprise inflation by changing the short-run trade-off between inflation and output. Conversely, the central bankers’ wage indexation would give the incentives for central bankers to perform inflationary policy and make inflation bias deteriorated.
    In addition, in line with Candel-Sa ́nchez and Campoy-Min ̃arro (2004), we analyze how the government establishes the optimal performance contract with central bankers. Our results show that the optimal punishment weight in performance contract should be designed positively related to the gap between optimal output and full-employment output, the relative weight on inflation stabilization versus output stabilization and the
    central bankers’ wage indexation. On the contrary, the optimal punishment weight should be designed negatively with the labors’ wage indexation.
    參考文獻: 范志萍 (2009)，「時序不一致性的三個議題」，政治大學經濟研究所博士論文。
    黃慧中 (2010)，「內生化懲罰與時序不一致」，台灣大學經濟研究所碩士論文。
    賴景昌 (2010)，「時序不一致」，上課講義。
    賴景昌 (2011)，總體經濟學，第三版。台北:雙葉書廊。
    Aalesina, A. and Gatti, R. (1995), “Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?” American Economic Review 85, 196-200.
    Barro, R. J. and Gorden, D. B. (1983), “Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101-121.
    Candel-Sa ́nchez and Campoy-Min ̃arro, J. C. (2004), “Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal? ” Public Choice 120, 29-39.
    Chortareas, G. E. and Miller, S. M. (2003), “Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs and Contract Targets,” Bulletin of Economic Research 55, 101-112.
    Froyen, R. T. and Guender, A. V. (2007), Optimal Monetary Policy under Uncertainty, ch.2. and ch.6. UK, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
    Fischer, S. (1977), “Wage Indexation and Macroeconomics Stability,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 5, 107-147.
    Gärtner, M. (2000), “Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments,” Journal of Economic Surveys 5, 527-561.
    Gärtner, M. (2006), Macroeconomics, 2nd Edition, ch.13. London: Prentice Hall.
    Gray, J. A. (1976), “Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Approach,” Journal of Monetary Economics 2, 221-235.
    Heijdra, B. J. (2009), Foundations of Modern Macroeconomics, 2nd Edition, ch.9. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mourmouras, I. A. (1997), “On Wage Indexing, Policy Credibility and Inflation,” Journal of Macroeconomics 19, 19-30.
    Romer, D. (2001), Advanced Macroeconomics, 4th Edition, ch.11. New York: McGraw-Hill.
    Rogoff, K. (1985), “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169-1190.
    Svensson, L. E. O. (1985), “Optimal Inflation Targets, Conservative Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts,” American Economic Review 87, 98-114.
    Walsh, C. E. (1995), “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers,” American Economic Review 85, 150-167.
    Waller, C. J. and VanHoose, D. D. (1992), “Discretionary Monetary Policy and Socially Efficient Wage Indexation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 1451-1460.　
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    104258017
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104258017
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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