政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/111308
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113325/144300 (79%)
Visitors : 51171033      Online Users : 906
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111308


    Title: 商品的不可分割性與逃漏稅決策
    Indivisibility of goods and tax evasion decision
    Authors: 吳東翰
    Wu, Tung Han
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    吳東翰
    Wu, Tung Han
    Keywords: 不可分割性
    外生所得
    風險趨避者
    社會福利
    租稅逃漏
    Indivisibility
    Exogenous income
    Risk-averter
    Social welfare
    Tax evasion
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2017-07-24 11:59:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 由於傳統探討逃漏稅行為之文獻皆假設商品之消費可無限細分,然而假設商品之消費皆可無限細分並不符合現實世界的情況。因此,本文設定一模型包含了可無限細分之財貨及不可無限細分之財貨,目的在於探討納稅人在存在不可無限細分之財貨的環境下是否會改變其逃漏稅決策,進而得出不同於傳統逃漏稅文獻之結論。而為了與傳統逃漏稅文獻相對應,除了商品具不可分割性的假設之外,其餘參數仍沿用傳統逃漏稅文獻之設定:所得、稽徵機率和處罰倍率皆為外生。

    透過模型設定,本文得到了三個和傳統逃漏稅文獻十分不同的結論。第一,在商品不可無限分割之下,納稅人願意進行逃漏稅的條件相對於藉由傳統逃漏稅模型所得之條件寬鬆,甚至是願意在對其不利的條件之下進行租稅逃漏。第二,逃漏稅額與稅率之間不全然為單調遞減的關係,其方向並不明確。因而可以改善傳統逃漏稅模型預測最適逃漏稅額與稅率之間為單調遞減關係之結果,使其更加符合現實世界的情況。

    第三,在商品具有不可分割性的假設之下,納稅人的風險偏好會因而改變使其不為一純粹的風險趨避者。因此,本文發現若是政府藉由調降政策變數以允許納稅人進行租稅逃漏,則政府之預期稅收會因為允許納稅人逃漏稅而提高,進而得以提升整體之社會福利。最後,在本文的設定之下,最適的處罰倍率不必然為無窮大。
    Traditional tax evasion researches all assumed that consumptions of goods are divisible, but those assumptions do not conform reality. Thus, our research set a model include one divisible good and one indivisible good in order to inquire that if taxpayers change their tax evasion decision under the assumption. In order to correspond to traditional tax evasion researches, our model still practices the settings of traditional tax evasion researches, which include exogenous income, fine rate and probability rate.

    Through the setting, our research obtained three important conclusions that are different from traditional tax evasion researches. First, under our assumption, taxpayers are more willing to evolve in tax evasions even the conditions are unfavorable to them. Second, the relationship between tax evasion and tax rate is no longer monotone decreasing. Therefore, the conclusion is able to reform the impractical conclusion obtain by traditional tax evasion researches.

    Third, under our setting, taxpayers are no longer pure Risk-Averter. Hence, we discover that if government slash the policy parameter to encourage taxpayers evolve in tax evasions, expect revenue of government will rise. Since the expect revenue of government rises, social welfare rises as well.
    Reference: Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972) "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.

    Andreoni, James (1991) "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty. Fit the Crime? ," RAND Journal of Economics, 22(3), 385-395.

    Andreoni, James, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein (1998) "Tax compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818-860.

    Arrow, Kenneth J. (1970) Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Amsterdam: North Holland.

    Becker, Gary S. (1968) "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.

    Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1986) "Soldiers of Fortune," In Social Choice and Public decision Making, ed. by Heller et. al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Clotfelter, Charles T. (1983) "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(3), 363-373.

    Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad Farrokh (1987) "On the Treatment of Income Tax Rates in Empirical Analysis of Tax Evasion," Kyklos, 40(3), 338-348.

    Dixit, Avinash (1973) "The Optimum Factory Town," Bell Journal Economics, 4, 637-51.

    Dowell, James (1982) "Risk Preference and the Work-Leisure Trade-Off," manuscript, Monash University.

    Joulfaian, David and Mark Rider (1996) "Tax Evasion in the Presence of Negative Income Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, 49, 553–570.

    Lee, Kangoh (2001) "Tax evasion and self-insurance," Journal of Public Economics, 81, 73-81.

    Malik, Arun S. (1990) "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, 21(3), 341-353.

    Marshall, John M. (1984) "Gambles and the Shadow Price of Death," American Economic Review, 74(1), 530-35.

    Ng Yew-Kwang (1965) "Why do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving Risk and the Indivisibility of Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, 73(5), 530-535.

    Poterba, James M. (1987) "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, 77(2), 234-239.

    Riley, John G. (1973) "Gammaville-An Optimum Town," Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 471-82.

    Rubin, Paul H. and Paul Chris W. (1979) "An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk," Economic Inquiry, 17, 588-96.

    Stigliz, Joseph E. (1982) "Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient," Journal of Public Economics, 17, 213-240.

    Ueng, K. L. and C. C. Yang (2006) "Tax evasion and limited liability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(3), 323-338.

    Weiss, Robert L. (1976) "The desirability of cheating incentives and randomness in the optimal income tax," Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1343-1352.

    Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1974) "A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-202.

    Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1987) "On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion," Public Finance Quarterly, 15(2), 123-137.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    104255009
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104255009
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    500901.pdf2326KbAdobe PDF2100View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback