Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111294
|
| Title: | 捐贈政治獻金之企業特性─以台灣上市櫃及興櫃公司為例
Corporation characteristics and political donations: evidence from Taiwan |
| Authors: | 李瑩貞 |
| Contributors: | 陳宇紳
李瑩貞 |
| Keywords: | 政商關係
政治獻金
家族企業
董監質押比
Political connection
Political donations
Family firms
Shares pledging |
| Date: | 2017 |
| Issue Date: | 2017-07-24 11:58:10 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 於2004年政治獻金法上路後，企業之資金用於建立政商關係之情形更為透明化，因此本文以台灣上市、上櫃及興櫃公司為樣本，探討政治獻金與公司特徵的關連性，公司特徵本研究著重在三方面：家族企業、特定產業及董監事質押比。實證結果顯示，企業捐贈政治獻金確實會受股權型態影響，家族企業捐贈政治獻金之意願及捐贈金額較高；在台灣特定產業之營運有賴於政府之許可或常與政府有合約關係，實證結果證實該特定產業較願意捐贈政治獻金，且捐贈金額較高。當董監質押比越高時，其董監事可能會降低其監督之誘因，經理人利用公司資金建立個人政治資本可能性增加，同時也可能基於其經營風險上升，而傾向於捐贈政治獻金建立政商關係，獲得利益，而實證結果顯示，董監事質押比與捐贈政治獻金呈顯著正相關。
After Political Contributions Law passed in 2004, the enterprise funds use for the political connection is more transparent. This study investigates the relation between corporate characteristics and political donation for which corporate characteristics include family ownership, industries where firms are more likely to benefit from political connections, and share pledging of board directors. Using a longitude political donation data of Taiwanese listed firms, we find that type of control ownership is associated with political donations; Specifically family firms are more willing to donate and make greater political donations than firms with other types of control ownership control. Our findings also indicate that industries that tend to have the contractual relationship with the government or whose operations are highly pertinent to regulatory permission, exhibit a higher willing to make political donations with greater amounts. Additionally, the empirical results show that there is a positive association between the percentage of shares pledged by the board of directors and political donations. |
| Reference: | 一、中文文獻
內政部委託研究報告，2012，我國政治獻金制度改革之研究。
王鼎銘，台灣政治獻金法及參選人政治獻金資料之實證研究，2007，選舉研究，第十四卷，第2期，121-144。
吳宗憲，2008，台灣民主轉型與金權政治，台灣民主季刊，第五卷，第3期，177-184。
李宗榮，2016，企業權力與民主：台灣企業集團2008年立委選舉的政治獻金分析，台灣社會學，第31期，99-139。
邱正仁、高蘭芬，2002，董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第3卷，第1期，127-162。
徐強、丁崇德、吳宗哲，2010，台灣家族企業關係網絡之探究。
張乃中，2012，家族政商關係、多角化策略與績效關連性之研究：台灣金融控股集團之觀察，國立中山大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
張元、王沛瀠，2015，政治關聯與盈餘品質，兩岸金融季刊，第三卷第四期。
曹吟華，2008，探討政商關係與企業績效、治理及獲取利益之關係，國立中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
陳信憲、陳雯香，2010，政治獻金對臺灣公司股票報酬之影響，台灣銀行季刊，第六十二卷，第2期，275-287。
陳家維，2013，政治獻金對營建業經營績效之影響，國立高雄第一科技大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
曾依平，1997，資金成本影響因素與最適財務結構之實證—以台灣上市公司之紡織業及食品業為例，私立朝陽技術學院財金學系碩士論文。
黃宗昊，2004，台灣政商關係的演變：歷史制度論分析，問題與研究，第四十三卷，第4期，35-72。
楊安，2010，誰是關鍵人物？台灣家族集團成員政商關係與多角化擴張之思考，國立中山大學企業管理學系研究所碩士論文。
溫育芳、楊鈞棠，2012，公司治理與舉債融資在降低代理問題替代性之探討，台灣銀行季刊，第六十三卷，第2期，108-130。
鄭桂蕙、林宛瑩、許崇源，2006，董監事持股高低對庫藏股買回誘因之影響，東吳經濟商學學報，54，1-26。
鍾喜梅、葉家豪，2010，家族連結、政商關係與多角化擴張：台灣家族集團的跨時分析，組織與管理，第三卷，第1期，67-106。
二、英文文獻
Adhikari, A., C. Derashid, and H. Zhang. 2006. Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 574–595.
Aggarwal, R. K., F. Meschke, and T. Wang. 2009. Corporate political contributions: investment or agency? SSRN.
Anderson, R. C., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-businesses ownership and firm performance: Evidence from S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328.
Baysinger, B. D. 1984. Domain Maintenance as an Objective of Business Political Activity: An Expanded Typology. The Academy of Management Review, 9, 248-258.
Bortolotti, B., M. Fantini, and D. Siniscalco.2001. Privatization: Politics, institutions and financial markets. Emerging Markets Review, 2, 109-137.
Brogaard, J., M. Denes, and R. Duchin. 2015. Political connections, Incentives and Innovation: Evidence from Contract-Level Data. Working paper, University of Washington.
Brown, C. O., and I. S. Dinc. 2005. The politics of bank failures: Evidence from emerging markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 1413-1444.
Burris, V. 2010.Corporations, Capitalists, and Campaign Finance. 247-262 in Handbook of Politics: State and Civil Society in Global Perspective, edited by Kevin T. Leicht and J. Craig Jenkins. New York: Springer.
Claessens, S., E. Feijen, and L. Laeven. 2008. Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 554-580.
Dinc, I.S. 2005. Politicians and banks: Political influences on government owned banks in emerging countries. Journal of Financial Economics, 77,453-479.
Domhoff, G. W. 1998.Who Rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000(3rd ed.). Mountain View, CA: Mayfield.
Donaldson, L., and J. H. Davis. 1994. Boards and Company Performance - Research Challenges the Conventional Wisdom, Corporate Governance, 2, 151-160
Faccio, M., and R. W. Masulis, and J. J. McConnell. 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts. Journal of Finance, 61, 2597 -2635.
Faccio, M. 2006. Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96, 369-386.
Faccio, M. 2010, The Characteristics of Politically Connected Firms. Financial Management, 39, 905-928.
Fisman, R. 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review, 91, 1095-1102.
Getz, K. A. 1993. Selecting Corporate Political Tactics. in Barry M. Mitnick (ed.), Corporate Political Agency: The Construction of Competition in Public Affairs. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Getz, K. A. 2001, Public Affairs and Political Strategy: Theoretical Foundations. Journal of Public Affairs, 305-329.
Hadani, M. 2007. Family matters: Founding family firms and corporate political activity. Business & Society, 46, 395-428.
Hillman, A. J., A. A. Cannella, and R. L. Paetzold. 2000. The resource dependence role of corporate directors: Strategic adaptation of board composition in response to environmental change. Journal of Management Studies, 37, 235-255.
Hillman, A. J., and M. A. Hitt. 1999. Corporate Political Strategy Formulation: A Model of Approach, Participation, and Strategy Decisions. The Academy of Management Review, 24, 825-842.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976.Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. 1993.The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48, 831-880
Krueger, A. O. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The American Economic Review, 64, 291-303.
Li, H., L. Meng, Q. Wang, and L. A. Zhou. 2008.Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms. Journal of Development Economics, 87, 283-299.
Lord, M. D. 2000. Corporate political strategy and legislative decision making: The impact of corporate legislative influence activities. Business & Society, 39, 76-93.
Lowery, D. 2007. Why do organized interests lobby? A multi-global, multi-context theory of lobbying. Polity, 39, 29-54.
Morck, R., D. Wolfenzon, and B. Yeung. 2004. Corporate governance, economic entrenchment and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 657-722.
Peng, M. W., and Y. Luo. 2000. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 486-501.
Pfeffer, J., G. R. Salancik. 1978.The external control of organizations: A resource-dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row.
Schuler, D. A., K. Rehbein, and R. D. Cramer. 2002. Pursuing Strategic Advantage through Political Means: A Multivariate Approach. The Academy of Management Journal, 45, 659-672.
Schuler, D. A., and K. Rehbein. 1997. The Filtering Role of the Firm in Corporate Political Involvement. Business and Society, 36, 116-139.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1994. Politicians and Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 995-1025.
Thompson, J. D. 1967. Organizations in Action, McGraw Hill, New York.
Tullock, G. 1980. Efficient Rent-Seeking. in James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock(eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
Yoshihara, K. 1988. The rise of Ersatz capitalism in south–east Asia, Oxford University Press: Kuala Lampur. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
104353024 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104353024 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| 302401.pdf | 688Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 78 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
