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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/106388


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    題名: 薪酬委員會品質是否會抑制公司進行租稅規避行為?
    Whether compensation committee quality will reduce tax avoidance in Taiwan?
    作者: 呂瑋釬
    Lyu, Wei Han
    貢獻者: 何怡澄
    Ho, Yi Cheng
    呂瑋釬
    Lyu, Wei Han
    關鍵詞: 薪酬委員會品質
    租稅規避
    Compensation committee quality
    Tax avoidance
    日期: 2016
    上傳時間: 2017-02-08 16:32:41 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文主要目的為探討經理人現金薪酬受到薪酬委員會品質影響時，是否會影響公司進行租稅規避行為。本文以當期有效稅率、現金有效稅率、總財稅差異以及永久性財稅差異衡量公司之租稅規避，而薪酬委員會品質衡量則依據Sun and Cahan (2009)所提出之方式衡量，並計算出各公司的薪酬委員會品質分數。研究期間為2012年至2014年之上市櫃公司，但不含產業性質特殊之金融業公司。其實證結果發現經理人現金薪酬與公司進行租稅規避行為呈顯著正相關，但加入薪酬委員會品質時，發現受到薪酬委員會品質影響之經理人現金薪酬與公司租稅規避行為呈顯著負相關，其結果顯示，當薪酬委員會品質越佳時，公司越不會進行租稅規避行為。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353112
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353112
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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