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    Title: 中心.衛星工廠訂價政策之研究
    Authors: 莫一誠
    Contributors: 劉維琪
    莫一誠
    Date: 1984
    Issue Date: 2016-12-05 17:06:08 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 第一章 緒論1
    第一節 研究動機與目的1
    第二節 研究方法與架構3
    第三節 研究限制5
    第二章 文獻探討7
    第一節 道德危險下的基本模式說明8
    第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果12
    第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果16
    第三章 中心－衛星工廠體系之探討33
    第一節 中心－衛星工廠的定義33
    第二節 中心－衛星工廠的互補利益36
    第三節 日本建立汽車衛星工業的實例38
    第四節 本論文中所採用的中心－衛星工廠模式42
    第四章 訂價方法之探討49
    第一節 訂價的重要性49
    第二節 邊際成本定價法52
    第三節 平均成本定價法53
    第四節 其他訂價方法57
    第五章 研究模式之提出與解答63
    第一節 模式的提出與說明65
    第二節 完全資訊下的分析與結果71
    第三節 不完全資訊下的分析與結果79
    第六章 結論與建議93
    第一節 結論93
    第二節 建議95
    參考書目97
    圖目錄
    圖 1 - 1 研究架構4
    圖 2 - 1 Principal和Agent在1st-best Solution的效用值16
    圖 2 - 2 fa≧0 , 1st - best solution和2nd - best solution之比較22
    圖 2 - 3 fa< 0 , 1st - best solution 和 2nd - bests Solution之比較22
    圖 2 - 4 例子的 2nd - best solution的圖27
    圖 3 - 1 傳統的衛星工廠觀念圖35
    圖 3 - 2 歐美的衛星工廠觀念圖35
    Reference: 中文部份：
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    18.楊文標：&quot;豐田式生產方式特質之三：中心衛星工廠之協力依存特性。&quot; 工業簡訊，72年10月；
    19.楊文標：&quot;豐田式生產方式特質文之四：中心衛星工廠之同步生產理念之練成。&quot; 工業簡訊；72年11月；pp.14-19。
    20.楊文標：&quot;豐田式生產方式特質之五：建立中心衛星工廠體系之起步－－作業層次之特性。&quot;工業簡訊；民72年12月；pp.10-26。
    21.楊文標：&quot;豐田式生產方式特質之六&quot;中心衛星工廠間之同步生產之砥柱－－平準化生產。&quot; 工業簡訊；73年2月；pp.9-14。
    22.廖德英：企業產品定價方法的研究。 67年東吳會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
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    24.鄧東濱：&quot;利潤最大化的商確。&quot; 中國財政季刊36期 ; 58年10月號：頁61–73。
    25.鄧東濱與陳潔光合著：&quot;小型企業管理。&quot; 聯經出版公司；民68年。第15章：行銷管理(二)訂價策略。頁151-160。
    26.鄧東濱與林炳文合著：個體經濟理論。 三民書局；民69年。
    27.賴士葆：&quot;中小企業與大型企業互補關係決定因素之研究－－機械業衛星工廠制度實例分析。&quot; 67年政大企研所未出版碩士論文。
    28.賴松鐘：&quot;台灣汽車工業中心衛星工廠制度改準之研究。&quot; 68年文化企研所未出版碩士論文。
    29.薛本棟譯：經濟分析本論（上）（下）册。 63年協志工業叢書。
    30.蘇翠桂：成本與定價決策之研究。 60年政大會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
    31.嚴永晃：&quot;從豐田式管理談建立中心衛星工廠制度。&quot; 工業簡訊；72年11月；pp.1-60。
    32.嚴永晃：&quot;中心－衛星工廠制度之研究：日本建立汽車衛星工業的實例。&quot; 工業簡訊；72年；pp.8-11。
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    Relation: 國立政治大學
    企業管理研究所
    碩士
    72
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Business Administation] Theses

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