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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/103654


    Title: 地方公共財之外部不經濟與其最適供給水準的決定
    Authors: 翁世芳
    Contributors: 林華德
    翁世芳
    Date: 1985
    Issue Date: 2016-11-09 17:12:47 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 論文提要
    如果把一公共財生產能量的極限範圍定義成一個地區，則我們發現如垃圾處理廠、核能發電廠這一類的地方公共財提供這一地區居民同時的、同等的服務。然而居住在這類公共財周圍的居民，於此同時的同等的利益之外，還得承受此類公共財於生產公共服務過程中所帶來的外部不經濟。如果座落的位置並非由這一地區的居民所決定，則在此有一部份居民必須直接承受外部不經濟的傷害，另外一部份居民卻可豁免的情況下，我們要問，如果這類公共財的生產水準可由這一地區居民共同決定的話，直接受害一方和不直接受害一方討價還價的結果，最後協議的供給水準會是什麼？這一協議的供給水準與雙方的政治優勢及外部不經濟的程度有什麼關係？雙方對此外部不經濟是否有外顯的惡感對這種關係的影響如何？
    本文對探討的對象加以界定之後，接著對現存的只探討社區之間利益外溢的文獻加以評述，並討論和比較與本文討論對象相同但觀點不同的文獻，以闡明為什麼本文以第四章的合作的、非零和遊戲理論模型來回答上述問題。第四章則為決定可容忍之外部不經濟和此類公共財供給水準的議價模型。第五章結論說明本文的發現及未來擴展方向。
    第一章 緒論1
    第一節 研究動構與研究目的1
    第二節 本文結構2
    第二章 研究對象3
    第一節 是一種公共財3
    第二節 是地方公共財8
    第三節 具有外部效果9
    第四節 本章結論11
    第三章 文獻回顧與比較15
    第一節 前言15
    第二節 Scott Mckinney 的雙佔模型18
    第三節 設置危險廢棄物處理設施的地方機能29
    第四章 決定可容忍之外部不經濟和公共財供給水準的議價模型43
    第一節 模型的特點與遊戲解43
    第二節 基本模型的建立48
    第三節 議價步驟與遊戲解52
    第四節 支出水準議價模型的參數變動54
    第五節 結論78
    第五章 結論與未來研究方向90
    第一節 結論90
    第二節 未來的研究方向92
    Reference: 一、中文部份：
    1.林華德，“外在性的評介”，台北市銀月刊第十四卷第十二期，民國七十二年。
    2.官威政，地方公共財最適水準之探討，政治大學財政研究所碩士論文，民國六十六年七月。
    3.廖國宏，“台灣地方公共財需求之研究”，台灣銀行季刊，第三十五卷第一期，民國七十三年三月。
    4.顏平原，“在生產公共財的MDP處方裡關於誘因問題的探討”，台北市銀月刊，第十六卷第二期，民國七十四年二月。
    二、英文部份：
    1. Auster, Richard D. “ Private Markets in Public Goods ”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1977, PP. 419-430.
    2. Benavie, Arthur, Mathematical Techniques For Economic Analysis, 1972,民國六十二年 順蓮出版社翻印。
    3. Bradford, David F. “Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects Comment”, Journal of Political Economy, October 1971, PP. 1119-29.
    4. Catsambas, Thanos “Substitutability, Seporability And The Distributional Implications of Public Goods ”, Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 10 No. 3, July 1982 PP. 333-353.
    5. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy “ Strateqic Behavior In Decentralized Planning Procedures ”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 2, Mauch, 1982 PP. 325-343.
    6. Clarke, Edward H. Demand Revelation & the Provision of Public Goods, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980.
    7. Cannolly, Michael, “ Public Goods, Externalities, and International Relations ”, Journal of Political Economy, April 1970, PP. 279-91.
    8. Friedman, James W. Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North-Holland Publishing Company, New York, 1977.
    9. Goetze, David, “A decentralized mechanism for Sitying Hazardous Waste Disposal Facilities”, Public Choice 39:1982, PP 361-370.
    10. Head, John G. & Shoup, Carl S. “ Public Goods, Private Goods, And Ambiguous Goods ”, Economic Journal , September, 1969 PP. 567-572.
    11. Kanemoto, Y. Theories of Urban Externalities, North-Holland Publishing Campany, 1980.
    12. Kenyon, D. A. “ Preference Rerelation and Supply Response In the Arena of Local Government”, Public Choice 42:1984, PP. 147-160.
    13. Matthews, Stervn A. “ Local Simple Games In Public Choice Mechanisms ”, International Economic Review. Vol. 23, No. 3, October, 1982 PP. 623-645.
    14. McKinney, Scott. “ Public Good Producers And Spillovers : An Analysis of Duopoly Behavior,” , Public finance Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, January, 1984 PP. 97-116.
    15. Meade, J. E. The Theory of Externalities, Institut Universitaire Hautes Etudes Interationales, 1973.
    16. Nash, J. F. “ The Bargaining Problem” , Econometrica , Vol. 18, 1950, PP. 155-162.
    17. ________“ Two-Person Cooperative Games ” Econometrica, Vol 21, 1953, PP. 128-140.
    18. Oates, Wallace E. “ The Regulation of Externalities: Efficient Behavior By Sources And Victims ” , Public Finance, No. 3, 1983, PP. 362-75.
    19. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard “ Participation And The Provision of Discrete Public Goods : A Strategic Analysis ” , Journal of Public Economics Vol. 24, 1984, PP. 171-193.
    20. Pauly, Mark V. “Optimality, Public Goods, and Local Governments : A General Theoretical Analysis” , Journal of Political Economy, June, 1970, PP. 572-86.
    21. Sandler, Todd & Culyer, A. J. “ Joint Products And Inter-Jurisdictional Spillovers : Some Public Goods Geometry”, KrKLOS, Vol. 35, 1982, Fasc. 4, PP. 702-709.
    22. Starrett, David A. “ Measuring Externalities And Second Best Distortions In The Theory of Local Public Goods ” , Econometrica, April 1980, PP. 627-42.
    23. Salter, Stephen J. “ The Distribution of Local Public Goods In A Non-Tiebout world” , Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, March, 1981, PP. 51-70.
    24. shibata, Hirofumi, “ A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” , Journal of Political Economy, February, 1971, PP. 142-54.
    25. TRAN, Huu Dung, “ Externalities, Public Goods, And Counternomal Effect ” , Public Finance Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3, July 1982, PP. 393-99.
    26. Tulkens, Henry “ Surplus-sharing Local Games in Dynamic Exchange Processes” , Review of Economic Studies, vol. 46, 1979, PP. 305-13.
    27. Yang, Chung-hsin, “Urban Spatial Structure And The Supply of Public Goods”, Academia Economic Papers, Vol. 9, No. 2 September 1981, 1981, PP. 145-66.
    28. Varian, Hal R., Microeconomic Analysis, 1978, 民國七十二年雙葉翻印。
    Relation: 國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    碩士
    73
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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