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    题名: 鄰避性設施設置協商策略比較之實驗研究
    其它题名: The Comparison of Negotiation Strategies:
    作者: 邱敬斌;賴世剛
    Chiu, Ching-Pin;Lai, Shih-Kung
    关键词: 鄰避性設施;賽局理論;實驗設計
    日期: 2007-05
    上传时间: 2016-08-18 11:38:04 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 鄰避設施的設置一直是存在政府與民眾部門間最大爭議的協商議題，而政府與民眾由於立場不同再加上互信基礎不足（葉名森，2002），其最終在該議題執行的最後結果往往以對抗的結果收場，就如同賽局理論的囚犯困境賽局一般。，因此本研究擬採囚犯困境賽局作為理論基礎，並以內湖垃圾掩埋場為實際案例說明，做為真實狀況的類比。另外，本研究以實驗設計研究方法，並以文化大學市政系及台北大學不動產與城鄉環境學系之同學分別扮演政府與民眾兩部門角色，來測試面臨不同賽局下之政府部門，在運用各種策略面對民眾各種回應情況下，其賽局結果是否有差異？以及在加上有限次數與無限次數重複賽局等因子條件下，各種策略執行結果是否亦有差異？測試結果發現，若以囚犯困境之賽局報酬（payoff）架構中，單純從政府效益衡量，政府在各種策略運用上並無差異。但政府追求公共利益最大化，因此單從政府部門思考恐不符合政府角色，因此本研究再從政府與民眾之報酬總合為社會總效益之分析，經實驗結果以單因子分析得知，在面臨不同情境下，其社會總效益在各種策略運用上呈現有不同差異結果。而若將有限次數、無限次數之重複賽局之因子納入分析，則以政府始終抱持與民間合作態度之忠誠策略及採觀望對手出招之以牙還牙兩策略呈現顯著差異結果。換言之，在不同情境下，其社會總效益在各種策略運用上呈現有不同差異結果。很顯然的，政府在面臨鄰避性設施設置時，在可能運用策略當中，當面臨不同情境之情況下，以及是否面臨有限或無限次數賽局時，其計畫執行效益可能因為運用策略不同而有差異，因此政府在面臨不同情境時其策略選擇便變得相當重要。
    The existence of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) facilities has always been a big issue between the public and private sectors that often hold different opinions and are lack of mutual trust. Confrontation could result in a situation which resembles the prisoner’s dilemma scenario. This paper investigates the installation of Nei-Hu Refuse Incineration Plant. The research method employs experimental design which two groups of student from Chinese Culture University and National Taipei University played the roles of the public and private sectors. The two groups of student applied different strategies in responding to different situations. Experiments with fixed number and infinitely repeated games seek to find out the difference according to varying strategies. The result showed that there was no difference in payoffs for the public sectors to apply different strategies from the governmental perspective, under the payoff structure in the prisoner`s dilemma game. Thus, the research further applied the sum of the public and private sectors` payoffs as the net social benefit using the single-factor factorial design. It was found that under different circumstances the net social benefit would differ given various strategic manipulations. If factors such as fixed number of times and infinitely repeated game were taken into account, the net social benefit derived from the publicprivate cooperation strategy would show a significantly different outcome from that of the tit-for-tat strategy. In other words, the net social benefit would be different if applying different strategies under different circumstances. Obviously, when the public sector is planning and constructing the NIMBY facilities, in case of different strategies being employed under different circumstances and considering whether fixed number of times and infinitely repeated game were involved, the benefits of plan implementation would be different. Therefore, it is very important for the public sector to adopt effective strategies under difference circumstances.
    關聯: 臺灣土地研究, 10(1), 1-22
    Journal of Taiwan land research
    数据类型: article
    显示于类别:[臺灣土地研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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